Russia: A New Patrol Submarine on the Market

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Russia: A New Patrol Submarine on the Market
December 04, 2007 19 55 GMT

2 drawings and photo http://www.stratfor.com/products/premiu ... ?id=299414



Summary
Russia will display its latest patrol submarine at a trade show under way in Malaysia. Already set to be sold to Indonesia, the submarine could see a significant uptick in sales should the design prove to be of sufficient quality and if Russia can produce the submarines efficiently.

Analysis

Russia will exhibit its new Amur-1650 patrol submarine at the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace 2007 exhibition in Malaysia Dec. 4-8, according to Rosoboronexport, the Russian arms exporter. Also on display will reportedly be an improved variant of the Kilo class (Project 636) patrol submarine. While the quality of the new design remains to be seen, a capable patrol submarine -- both its design and fabrication -- is within Russia's demonstrated capabilities. Sales have already been announced to Indonesia and Venezuela.

Amur is the export designation of the Project 677 Lada class intended for service in the Russian navy. The Amur-1650 and the Amur-950 are the two initial variations being marketed by Rosoboronexport. Their single hull is a significant departure from the double hulls that characterized Soviet submarine design (the additional hull was intended to make the sub more survivable). This move to a single hull makes the Amur-1650 much more comparable in terms of displacement (size) to German and French designs now on the market. Both Amur designs are reportedly capable of being extended to include an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system, though the exact nature of Russia's AIP design, or how close it is to being ready for testing, is not clear.

AIP is now available in the German Type 214 design, which is widely exported and includes such advanced customers as Israel and South Korea. However, even if the Amur series proves uncompetitive with that design, it could still be an attractive option. Both Indonesian and Malaysian defense spending has risen lately, and Indonesia has already ordered four Kilos and two Amurs. Meanwhile, Russia has high hopes for the Chinese and Indian markets.

Rosoboronexport is marketing both Amur designs and the variants of the Kilo class on the market fitted with the Club-S (NATO designation: SS-N-27 "Sizzler") anti-ship cruise missile. The Club can be launched from torpedo tubes, and the terminal phase of its flight is supersonic.

The Amur-950 is especially interesting in this regard. Fitted with 10 vertical launch tubes to the rear of the sail, it reportedly will be able to quickly launch 10 anti-ship missiles in a salvo (launching that many from the torpedo tubes would require reloading, which can take several minutes). While both Russian and U.S. nuclear attack submarines have been built with similar capacities, this is the first time that vertical launch tubes have been incorporated into a patrol submarine design and made available on the open market.

With this modest salvo capability, the Amur-950 design increases the chance of a successful strike against a well-defended target; it can also quickly hit more individual targets while minimizing the sub's vulnerability. Russian naval thinking has long been informed by the need to penetrate the U.S. Navy's superior defensive systems. One of the ways the Soviets settled upon to do this was to overwhelm that system with missiles, and the Amur-950 can at least partially trace its design to that long-standing consideration.

This is not to say that 10 missiles necessarily have much of a chance of overwhelming a modern Aegis-equipped surface combatant (should it be at a sufficiently high state of alert). But the capability is also not one to scoff at; it is one that naval powers in the market for asymmetric challenges to U.S. naval dominance might find attractive.

The vertical launch cells might prove even more attractive for India in particular, as they could be a means of making the Brahmos anti-ship missile a viable export product for the submarine market (the basic Brahmos design is too wide to be launched from the standard 21-inch torpedo tubes, or even the larger 26-inch tubes). Some reports suggest this has been the plan for some time. However, India -- and China -- ultimately are pushing forward with their own domestic production capabilities (and New Delhi has no shortage of troubles with Moscow).

In either case, the Amur is already on the market and comes well armed -- if only Russia can produce them efficiently.

[u-5075]

Not all submarines, but this

Not all submarines, but this has to do with India and Russian subs -- to some extent (in bold below).


Military: India's Russian Problem
December 04, 2007 14 41 GMT

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premiu ... d=Analyses


Summary

India's plans for naval modernization and expansion have long involved a series of deals with Russia. India's frustration has mounted lately, especially over massive delays with an old Russian aircraft carrier.

Analysis

India publicly questioned its defense relations with Russia on Dec. 3, when Indian naval chief Adm. Sureesh Mehta suggested that the delays that have plagued the refitting and delivery of the former Soviet Kiev-class carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov (to be re-dubbed the Vikramaditya), were making New Delhi rethink its defense relationship with Russia.

His statement, made on the eve of India's Navy Day, is merely the latest development in a long-standing dispute between the two countries over the price of the Gorshkov, which has cost Russia much more than initially anticipated and is now significantly behind schedule. (Russia also likely took advantage of the project and used workers funded by India to carry out other naval construction efforts.) After agreeing to a onetime sum of $1.5 billion, Russia now reportedly wants an additional $1.2 billion to, among other things, rework nearly 1,500 miles of wiring on the ship.

New Delhi is working to deploy a carrier fleet significantly more advanced than the old Hermes-class carrier, the Viraat (launched in 1953, acquired from Great Britain and commissioned in 1987). Eventually, this will include at least one indigenously designed and built air defense ship (ADS) similar in capability to the Gorshkov. But while the Russian-built carrier is slated to serve alongside its domestically built counterparts, it also is intended as an interim solution.



In this context, the timeliness of the Gorshkov's delivery becomes especially valuable; the longer it is delayed, the longer India's navy relies entirely on the aging Viraat and the closer the ADS comes to completion (construction began this year). But while New Delhi's ultimate objective is to build its own carriers, there are a number of concerns.

First, the ADS is significantly larger than any warship India has yet constructed. Such ambitious projects (such as the Advanced Technology Vessel project to build a nuclear-powered submarine -- now in its third decade without impressive results) often stumble, and the ADS has already seen delays.

Second, the navalized MiG-29K that is to be carried by both the Gorshkov and the ADS is a significant shift to more conventional fixed-wing aircraft. India's fixed-wing carrier aviation experience has been almost exclusively with the Harrier jet, which lands vertically. Operational experience at sea on the Gorshkov's flight deck with the MiG-29Ks will be essential to the forward progress of India's carrier ambitions.

And since the MiG-29K is also being purchased from Moscow, New Delhi is in a tight spot. Patience has long worn out, but India's military ties to Russia are many (and, at times, highly beneficial). The navy would be hard-pressed to move forward on fixed wing naval aviation without the Gorshkov and the MiG-29Ks -- not to mention the fact that there is not a single comparable carrier on the market anywhere.

Meanwhile, rumblings continue about attempts to lease one or two Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (the best attack sub the Soviets ever built) -- though India could now be hesitating more than Russia. Furthermore, India's army is finalizing details on a $1.24 billion contract for more than 300 T-90S main battle tanks -- Russia's latest model (an indigenous tank design) was found insufficient. Such essentially hardwired ties to Moscow leave India in a weak negotiating position.

Walking away from the Gorshkov deal would entail not only walking away from a significant investment, but also realignment of the Indian navy's progress on a number of fronts -- carrier aviation being only the most prominent. However, while this leaves India heavily reliant on Moscow for the next five to 10 years (barring a fundamental defense realignment), this strategic vulnerability is not going unnoticed in New Delhi. India has always been cautious -- sometimes in thinking more than in practice -- about becoming too reliant on any one sponsor for defense matters. That hesitation has no clearer manifestation than the delays and price squabbles with the Gorshkov. It is a lesson India will not soon forget. As work on both the ADS and an indigenously built submarine demonstrate, India also is carefully cultivating its own defense industrial base. Indeed, Mehta told the Press Trust of India that this new sub will begin sea trials in 2009 (a bold claim, but nonetheless noteworthy).

Meanwhile, the rest of the world is beginning to take notice of defense contracts in India. Significant U.S. and European competition turned out for India's Multirole Combat Aircraft competition and both the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company and Boeing have offered their own designs as candidates for India's maritime reconnaissance needs. Long-standing ties cannot easily be done away with, but Moscow has begun to find itself with real competition for defense hardware sales in India.