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On this Day The Battle Begins In Ernest Which Turns The Coarse Of The War In The Pacific.
To All those Who Had Relatives And Friends There...... A Long Whistle And A Salute!
This Excerpt Comes Off The Net from Chris Hawkinson. Very Interesting Reading......
THE BATTLES BEGIN
As predicted by Hypo, the Japanese offensive against the Aleutians began on 3 June: Japanese carrier aircraft attacked Dutch Harbor at 1555Z/0655 locally.137 A little over two hours after Admiral Nimitz repeated his second alert, while the Japanese renewed their attack on Dutch Harbor, Midway notified him that the Japanese "Main Body" was sighted at 2100Z by a patrol plane on a bearing of 261 degrees and a distance of 700 miles from Midway.138 Eighteen minutes later, apparently as a result of Hawaii's receipt of the report of another patrol plane, CINCPAC learned that a second group of ships had been sighted. The second, a smaller group of warships and cargo vessels, was located 470 miles from Midway. Nimitz immediately forwarded this information to the task force commanders, to Admiral King, and to General Emmons, COMGENHAWDEPT.139 Two hastily prepared clarifications were sent later that stated his belief that the forces sighted were the "attack and occupation force," the most distant consisting of "11 ships course 090 speed 19." The Strike Force was "expected to be separated."140 All of this information and the roles of CINC 5, CINC 1st Air Fleet, and CINC 2 were included in CINCPAC's Bulletin Number 81 sent in the late afternoon of 3 June.141
Com 14's daily report was released in mid-afternoon on 3 June several hours before the Alaska operations began. It was a timely summary of the knowledge gained from translations and other analysis. Most of it quickly found its way to the task forces. Hypo isolated those units "interested in operations against U.S. possessions." Their report correctly if too briefly identified Admiral Yamamoto, CINC Combined, as "in general charge." The actual role of the First Fleet as "Main Body" of the two operations continued to elude analysis. Hypo reported that Admiral Yamamoto, the commander of this fleet, "appeared only marginally interested in the current operations. All the other major commanders were correctly identified: Admiral Kondo, CINC 2, whose battleships, cruisers, and destroyers supported both the Strike and Occupation Forces, was characterized as "in command of invasion forces in Midway area"; CINC First Air Fleet as "in command of Striking Forces against Central Pacific bases"; and CINC Fifth Fleet as "in command of invasion and Striking Forces in North."142
Com 14's analysis was hampered by the fact that no traffic was originated by any of the Japanese commanders after either 28 or 29 May 1942. Since the entire Combined Fleet observed radio silence and a new cipher was introduced in JN 25 at the same time, analysts were left with virtually nothing to analyze except communications contacts initiated by shore-based radio stations, and old messages to and from ships at sea in the Baker 8 cipher. In the latter category was an errant transmission from the cruiser Nagara revealing her role, as flagship of the Strike Force's plane guard destroyers, a fact that was immediately conveyed to the CTFs.143 Shore-station communications, however, remained active. Though messages originated by shore stations could not be read, their contacts revealed that Wake was not a stopping-off place for either the Strike Force or the Invasion Force.
Among the many topics demanding Admiral Nimitz's attention at this time was the need to ensure an adequate flow of information into his headquarters during the forthcoming battles. Recalling the paucity of information available during the Battle of the Coral Sea and mindful that certain matters concerning enemy losses in that battle were still not resolved, Admiral Nimitz sent a quick reminder to Midway and to CTFs 4, 7, 9, 16, and 17: "Successful and timely employment Striking Forces. . . almost wholly dependent on reliable combat intelligence with emphasis on enemy composition, position and condition. Damage to enemy must be carefully evaluated and reasonably certain results be reported. Reports must get through promptly."144 Unfortunately, the record of 4 June suggests that his guidance could not be followed by those he most depended upon, the carriers and the B17s. Obviously full of confidence in his intelligence and his plans for the next day's action, however, Admiral Nimitz also sent this encouraging message to Midway and all task force commanders at the eleventh hour on 3 June: "The situation is developing as expected. Carriers our most important objective should soon be located. Tomorrow may be the day you can give them the works."145
(The next day, 5 June 1942, in apparent response to the Nimitz message cited above, Washington directed the use of new terminology to describe communications intelligence and new cryptographic systems for its transmittal. The abbreviations "DI" for decryption intelligence, "TI" for traffic intelligence, and "RI" for radio intelligence were now mandated. Any message or report containing DI was to be transmitted in the COPEK system. Information from TI alone was to be sent in the CETYH system. Both systems were apparently available to all COMB addressees since there was no immediate change in distribution. 146 It is impossible to determine if this guidance was a help or a hindrance. It is certain, however, that, during the battle, it was ignored by everyone.)
Just after midnight on the morning of 4 June, Nimitz realized that he had not yet advised the task forces how far the "Main Body" was from Midway. Accordingly, he repeated messages sent earlier concerning its course and speed and included the information that this force was now "574 miles" from Midway.147 All remained quiet until shortly after dawn when at 1804Z/0604 local time on Midway on 4 June, a reconnaissance plane from Midway spotted two Japanese carriers and their escorts and transmitted an electrifying report that was immediately repeated by Admiral Nimitz to his task forces, to Admiral King, and to General Emmons: "Many planes heading Midway from 320 distant 150 miles!"148 Less than half an hour later, at 1835Z, Midway was struck by Japanese carrier aircraft.149 History does not provide an explanation of why the Japanese chose to launch aircraft 150 rather than 50 miles from their objective. It is possible that the original translation was somehow flawed. The flaw could have been in any of several places, for example, the preparation, transmittal, or intercept of the text of the message, or in an incorrect code group meaning. All of this mattered very little on 4 June, however, when the Japanese carrier aircraft were spotted on their way to strike Midway.
Of the more than 200 units of the Japanese Combined Fleet deployed in the Alaska and Midway operations, no fewer than 129 were either warships (113) or submarines (16). At Midway, however, primarily because of the requirements of their complex plan and their losses in the Coral Sea, the Japanese could actually produce but 4 carriers, 17 escorts, 229 aircraft, and 17 seaplanes. The remaining Japanese vessels and aircraft were either committed to the Northern operation or were too far away to support the carriers.150
Compared to the onrushing Japanese Strike and Occupation Forces, the United States Navy was able to muster only seventy-three ships (forty-seven warships and twenty-six submarines). However, the United States was able to concentrate its forces and produce at Midway a slight advantage where it counted the most, at the scene of the battle. The United States had 3 carriers and 22 escorts at sea, 234 aircraft afloat, and 110 at Midway. All of these vessels and aircraft, as well as a few of the submarines, were on the scene at Midway on the morning of 4 June 1942.
In addition, Admiral Nimitz and his task force commanders had other less tangible but invaluable advantages as well: advance knowledge of the identity of Japanese objectives; virtually the entire Japanese Midway and Aleutian Strike Forces order of battle; the organization of the Midway forces, i.e., Striking Force, Occupation Force, Invasion Force, etc.; the preliminary and final timetables of the Midway and Aleutian Striking Forces; the general direction from which each force would approach Midway; and the Midway Striking Force's plan of attack. All of this information was supplied by communications intelligence in time to influence decisively the provisions of Admiral Nimitz's Operations Plan 29-42.
As foretold by Rochefort and Layton, the Battle of Midway occurred three days before Admiral Yamamoto planned to assault the island with his landing forces. The Marines and sailors in their prepared positions on Midway, the Navy and Marine Corps flyers on Midway, the submarines in Task Force 4, the patrol aircraft in Task Force 7, the surface patrols in Task Force 9, the B17s in the 7th Bombing Command, and the carriers of Task Forces 16 and 17 all were ready for the fight. They were ready because Admiral Nimitz was able to position them in the relative certainty that the attacking Japanese warships and carriers would be where COMINT had predicted, at the day and time COMINT had provided.
In the absence of Japanese radio communications from the ships approaching Midway on 4 June, Hypo reported to Admiral Nimitz how they had disposed of their intercept resources to deal with the crisis. Watches were doubled under a "Condition 1" at the intercept station on Oahu, 151 and a combination radio direction finding and intercept facility was temporarily established on Midway. Intercepted traffic increased accordingly but not from the onrushing Japanese task forces.
Hypo concluded, "Excellent radio silence is being maintained despite the reported attacks on them." Thanks to the additional direction finding dispositions on Midway, as well as the reports received from naval aircraft of all types and from the army bombers operating from Hawaii and Midway, Admiral Nimitz was nevertheless in an excellent position not only to keep track of events but actually to control the movements of his own forces in relation to the attacking Japanese. This situation was in sharp contrast to the Battle of Coral Sea only a few weeks before, when CINCPAC was virtually blind to unfolding events.
When radio silence was finally broken by the attacking Japanese at about 1200 Midway local time, their frequencies were immediately intercepted and bearings reported probably by the temporary station at Midway.152 Except for encoded submarine communications, radio traffic consisted largely of plain language air-to-ground exchanges between carrier aircraft and the carriers that ended when the carriers themselves were lost. This information became part of an immense body of data concerning American efforts to learn the locations of the several Japanese task forces involved in the battle.
Admiral Nimitz's appreciation for the magnitude of his victory came gradually from visual observations and not from COMINT. Visual observations, however, were rife with ambiguous directional and ship identification information. More than once CINCPAC pleaded for more precision, particularly in those reports concerning the Japanese carriers.153 In the absence of Japanese carrier communications, it was finally from visual reports that he learned in mid-afternoon of the 4th that Admiral Nagumo had probably lost the four carriers of his Strike Force.154 Precise word of Nagumo's loss did come from COMINT, however, but not until 6 June when Hypo reported that Admiral Nagumo "appeared aboard the heavy cruiser Nagara sometime this morning, apparently having lost his flagship,"155 and Melbourne reported that the Chief of Staff, 1st Air Fleet, was also addressed aboard Nagara.156
As dawn approached on the morning of 5 June, Midway itself was safe. At midnight the night before, Admiral Nimitz had sent his heartfelt congratulations in a message to the task force commanders:
You who participated in the Battle of Midway today have written a glorious page in our history. I am proud to be associated with you. I estimate that another day of all out effort on your part will complete the defeat of the enemy.
That morning there was a growing but not universal consensus that the Japanese were hurriedly leaving the area. At one point during the morning of the 5th, CINCPAC originated a message to both TF 16 and 17, to Midway by cable, and to COMINCH, that the Japanese "will attempt assault and occupation Midway regardless past losses."157 In either case, the task of finding the enemy and inflicting still further punishment was preeminent. No one in CINCPAC headquarters was aware that Admiral Yamamoto had postponed part of the Northern Force's operations and temporarily diverted both the Second Strike Force and the Covering Group to assist Admiral Nagumo in his extremity. They were aware, however, of a report from Melbourne on the 5th that stated that CarDiv 3 "shows slight indication that unit may proceed southward to join forces in Midway area." Fortunately for the American cause, Admiral Yamamoto vacillated for several hours before deciding to cancel his orders and restore the forces diverted from the northern area. 158
In sharp contrast to the voluminous reports from Hypo and his intelligence staff, a more truncated view of events was recorded by the CINCPAC War Plans division. Their daily report to CINCPAC sheds an interesting light on the treatment of information obtained from intelligence sources. While adding nothing positive to the general body of knowledge, their efforts are of interest because they were recorded in the CINCPAC War Diary; they again demonstrate how, as in Washington, a war plans staff group in a major headquarters experienced difficulty in communicating with its leadership. In the CINCPAC War Diary for 5 June, War Plans summarized the Japanese Order of Battle of the Strike and Occupation Forces only and the results of the battle of 4 June on both sides. Their report did not record losses of a fourth Japanese carrier or the Yorktown, though by 050335Z (041635 Hawaiian War Time) CINCPAC knew of both the Japanese losses and the condition of the Yorktown. The summary ended by documenting the third air attack on Dutch Harbor and the sighting reports of two CVs southwest of that port, information probably received from Admiral Theobald's representative.159
On 6 June, Hypo was aware of and quickly reported the implications of the fact that the flag of the 1st Air Fleet, which was a recognizable communications entity, had moved from the Akagi to the cruiser Nagara. Analysts at Hypo also reported on the 6th that "at 1710 on 5 June CINC Combined began sending tactical traffic thus breaking his silence that began 28 May." Other significant items in COMINT reports for 6 June included the fact that 4AAF was prepared to provide air cover to all retiring elements; a call for CarDiv 5 probably to send the Zuikaku to the area; reflections of a U.S. air attack on Japanese cruisers, possibly the Mogami and the Mikumo; the fact that no carriers had been heard in the Midway area for twenty-four hours; and the startling revelation from radio direction finding that Admiral Yamamoto himself was in the North Pacific possibly in company with two divisions of battleships. This report represented Hypo's discovery of the Japanese Main Body.160
In a War Diary entry for the 6th, War Plans summarized the actions of the 4th and 5th. The Japanese were described as "retiring" as the U.S. search continued. The assessment of Japanese losses did not reflect the by then well-known fact that all four carriers were lost: two CV lost; two CV damaged; two BB damaged; two CA damaged; two AP damaged; and all aircraft either lost or badly damaged. Concerning the Yorktown, which on the 6th was struck by two torpedoes fired by the Japanese submarine I168,161 the War Plans entry noted only that attempts at salvage (from bomb damaged inflicted on the 4th) continued. Finally, the entry also noted that Dutch Harbor experienced its fourth air attack. 162
Admiral Spruance decided that the Battle of Midway ended on 8 June 1942.163 COMINT for 7 and 8 June chronicled the fact that the Japanese were withdrawing in two echelons. One group moved southwest toward Saipan under the protection of the 4AAF and the other, which included Admiral Yamamoto, was withdrawing to the northwest with air support from CarDiv 3.164 All activity was conducted under the direction of Admiral Yamamoto, who was now personally directing the final phases of his Midway operation. Routing of a message for CINC 1st Air Fleet from Ominato via the carrier Ryujo suggested to Hypo that possibly the admiral aboard this carrier from CarDiv 3, Rear Admiral Kakuji Kakuta, was the new senior officer in the 1st Air Fleet. Subsequent communications activity was to negate this suggestion by indicating that Admiral Nagumo was in fact still aboard the Nagara.165 Still sensitive to the fact that a missing Japanese carrier was a potential problem, Layton again sounded the alarm that the carrier Zuikaku could not be located. His report suggested that it may have been joining the forces withdrawing from Midway. Layton also reported that COMINT indicated no CVs remained among forces that attacked Midway.166
The disparity between current events and War Plans reporting continued for another day. An entry in CINCPAC's War Diary by War Plans on the 7th suggested either that the entry was written before the COMINT report became available or that War Plans analysts were unwilling to accept information from that source. Instead of reporting that all four Japanese carriers had been sunk by American flyers, the entry recorded "incomplete reports" from army bombers and from TF 16 that a possible fourth Japanese CV had been sunk. In the Aleutians, it reported contact with the Japanese was being maintained by PBYs but "no effective attacks by bombers or torpedoes." There was no reflection of the status of the Yorktown, which sank at 0501Z on 7 June 1042.167
By 8 June COMINT from both Melbourne and Hawaii was able to report that the withdrawing Japanese occupation forces under Admiral Kondo appeared to be headed for Saipan. Radio direction finding placed CINC Combined almost due west from Midway, and the remnants of the Strike Force appeared to be heading toward Japan.168 Layton's report for the day once again warned that the Zuikaku appeared to be active and might be en route to join the withdrawing forces.
169 Hypo confided to its War Diary that the Japanese in Tokyo had "commenced radio deception and were attempting to give the impression that a large fleet is maneuvering." In its daily report for the 8th, Hypo noted that tactical calls for up to twelve tactical units were traced to Tokyo through the "sloppy communications practices" of the Tokyo operator and DF.170 The 8th was the final day that the CINCPAC War Diary contained any information from War Plans concerning either Midway or the Aleutians. It recorded that the enemy continued to withdraw from Midway and that bad weather in the Aleutians hindered operations. Though the war continued in the Aleutians for several months, the Battle of Midway thus had three endings: on the 6th when Admiral Spruance turned away from his pursuit of the retreating Japanese; on the 7th when Admiral Fletcher's flagship, the Yorktown, finally sank beneath the waves; and for CINCPAC, on the 8th, when his diary no longer reflected an interest in the defeated Japanese forces.
CONCLUSIONS
After the battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians, the invaluable contributions made by communications intelligence were recognized by senior naval officials in Washington and Honolulu. In their words, communications intelligence had given the United States a "priceless advantage" over the Japanese.171 In few battles before or since would the navy possess an enemy's order of battle, their plan of attack, and their timetable, all of which had been provided to the naval high command by the communications intelligence units in Hawaii and Australia under the direction of Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and Lieutenant Rudolph Fabian, respectively.
With their performance during this period, both centers reclaimed the synergism that had marked their efforts before Pearl Harbor. There is no doubt that, had he lived to receive the Distinguished Service Medal - that was eventually posthumously awarded by the secretary of the navy in 1986 for his efforts to support CINCPAC prior to Midway - Commander Rochefort would have said that the medal truly belonged to the entire communications intelligence effort in the Pacific.172 (Fabian too was recommended for a DSM by MacArthur. Like Rochefort's, it too was not approved.)
On the eve of each of the battles fought in May and June 1942, Japanese communications security attempted to prevent U.S. monitors from penetrating the navy's intentions. It was not until the end of May, however, that radio silence effectively eliminated access by Hypo, Melbourne, and Washington to even those few messages related to the impending operations that were exchanged outside the confines of a new cipher and a new callsign system. Fortunately, the Japanese efforts to protect their secrets came too late to prevent what the world now knows was a major U.S. intelligence achievement.
Armed with the support of excellent communications intelligence and of his superiors in Washington, CINCPAC was able to satisfy all three of Clausewitz's "principles of warfare": decision, concentration, and offensive action. Prior to the invasion of Port Moresby, his fast carrier task forces successfully turned aside the Japanese strike force, virtually eliminated the effectiveness of Carrier Division Five originally scheduled to participate in the Midway operation, and forced postponement of the Japanese strikes on Ocean and Nauru by the judicious placement of CTF 16 when it was certain that the carriers Hornet and Enterprise would be spotted by Japanese patrols.
The same support from communications intelligence also allowed CINCPAC to deploy submarines, ships, B17s, B26s, fighters and observation planes to defend Midway and the Aleutians. By knowing the approximate dates for the planned attacks on the Aleutians and Midway, CINCPAC successfully disengaged his carrier task forces from the South Pacific after Coral Sea without being observed; he successfully redeployed them precisely where they could surprise the unsuspecting Japanese Strike Forces.
Without doubt these were major contributions to a truly decisive American victory, a victory of the magnitude of Salamis in 480 B.C. and Jutland in 1915. As a result of the Battle of Midway, the U.S. Pacific Fleet permanently frustrated all Japanese ambitions to establish a defensive perimeter anchored east of the Marshalls. Most importantly, however, the victory exposed to U.S. Navy planners Japan's incapability to wage effective carrier warfare in the central Pacific. Amidst its unrivaled success, however, this story of the contribution of communications intelligence is not quite complete.
Of the mobile detachments on the Lexington, the Yorktown, and the Enterprise, which accompanied the U.S. task forces (the Hornet had no detachment at Midway), we know in detail from the postaction recollections of Captain Forrest Biard, USN (ret) - who served under Admiral Fletcher, CTF 17, on the Yorktown - the type of contribution probably made to the commanders' tactical decision-making process during Coral Sea. At Midway, however, we know only that they "provided valuable information after contact was made, through interception of Japanese plain language reports."173 Thus until survivors reveal the detailed contributions made by communications intelligence to the tactical decisions of Admirals Fletcher and Spruance, CTF 17 and 16, respectively, the COMINT chronicle will be missing that part of the story. (Admiral Fullenwider, who supported Admiral Fletcher, is dead. Admiral Spruance was supported by a COMINT detachment for which the linguist was Captain Gilven Slonim, USN (ret). On 16 May 1989, Slonim advised the author that he was preparing a book about his experiences in the "RI" detachments that he plans to have published "in time for the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Midway.")
EPILOGUE
The Battle of Midway continued long after the combatants retired. Because of the confusion that surrounded the nascent and relatively unfamiliar U.S. Navy policies governing secrecy and need to know in 1942, the Battle of Midway was refought in the newspapers and courthouses of three major U.S. cities - New York, Chicago, and Washington - for several weeks after the battle actually ended. At issue was how the Navy knew of Japanese plans, how that knowledge came into the possession of a newspaper reporter, and how the government should handle a serious security violation. In the end no one was ever formally punished for revealing to the public the role communications intelligence played in the Japanese defeat. Whether the Japanese ever discovered that U.S. cryptologists had successfully penetrated their most secret operational code, or even suspected the magnitude of the warning provided by COMINT, remains a matter of conjecture to this day. At the time, however, officials within OP-20-G were certain that subsequent almost draconian corrections in Japanese communications procedures and cryptography were traceable directly to the following events.
On 17 May 1942, the survivors of the Lexington were en route to San Diego and San Francisco aboard the USS Barnett and the USS Elliot. (One account said that Admiral Fitch and Captain Sherman were aboard the transport Chester.) Anticipating their arrival in the United States, CINCPAC sent the following message to Admiral Fletcher, CTF 17, with information copies to COMINCH and the Commandants of the 11th and 12th Naval Districts:
It is imperative that all survivors Coral Sea action being returned Mainland be instructed that they are to refrain from any mention of the action upon their arrival west coast port. Com11 is requested berth transports where debarkation can be conducted without contact with newsmen. All personnel will probably require reoutfitting. There will be no publicity regarding this matter until Navy Department release. Barnett and Elliot will stop at San Diego to discharge excess personnel en route San Francisco. 174
Despite these precautions by CINCPAC, events aboard the Barnett resulted in even more damaging revelations than those CINCPAC had hoped to prevent. In ancillary actions, CINCPAC learned that medical reports filed in Navy Bureau of Medicine channels revealed the status of American carriers after the battle.
In a hasty message on 3 June 1942, CINCPAC notified COMINCH and requested immediate action to suppress the errant reports.175 at 2050 on 8 June 1942, COMINCH sent the following message to CINCPAC:
Contents of your 311221 May were published almost verbatim in several newspapers yesterday. Article originated with correspondent Stanley Johnson [sic] embarked on [USS] Barnett until June 2d. While your dispatch was addressed Task Force Commanders it was sent in channel available to nearly all ships which emphasizes need of care in using channels para. Cominch investigating on Barnett and at San Diego. 176
CINCPAC's message of 311221 May contained his final appreciation of the Japanese order of battle prior to Midway.
True to his word, COMINCH immediately convened several formal inquiry panels, which began gathering depositions from witnesses. The panels inquired into the circumstances aboard the Barnett, which, in addition to most of the crew, carried the executive officer of the Lexington, Commander Morton T. Seligman, and a newspaper correspondent, Mr. Stanley Johnston, back to the United States, and in Chicago in the headquarters Colonel R.R. McCormick's newspaper, the Chicago Tribune, where the story had originated.177 According to Admiral King's biographer, Thomas B. Buell in Master of Seapower, Admiral King "was in a white fury at his headquarters while his staff frantically tried to discover the source of the leak."
By 11 June all of the principals had been interviewed. Those aboard the Barnett were interviewed more than once. Out of this work emerged a very unpleasant picture of official neglect and confusion concerning the safeguarding of communications intelligence both on the Barnett and in the newspapers. Because of the perception that newsmen accompanying U.S. forces were sworn to secrecy, indictments of the principal employees of the Chicago Tribune were sought on 9 June, even before the inquiries were completed. They were returned on 7 July by a Chicago grand jury. At this point serious snags appeared at every turn, and the matter lay in the hands of the grand jury and a special prosecutor for several weeks while the navy added depositions to a record that increasingly showed that Johnston, a British subject, had, with the help or negligence of others, betrayed the trust placed in him.
While many in the navy focused on finding a suitable punishment for Johnston, COMINCH issued another memorandum on 20 June 1942 similar to those he had originated in March and April. It was sent to CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and CDR- SWPACFORCE bearing the subject "Control of Dissemination and Use of Radio Intelligence." Within the navy this would prove to be the only remedial action to come out of the Johnston case.178
On 24 June the New York newspaper PM published a story without attribution announcing that the Justice Department did not plan to prosecute anyone, either in the newspapers or in the U.S. Navy, 179 as a result of their role in the revelations. Ironically, three days later the navy discovered that Johnston's own government had earlier declared him "unreliable" as a correspondent.180 It was the same government, however, that subsequently forged the ultimate solution by addressing the correlation between the Johnston revelations and safeguarding communications intelligence.181
On 14 July, the special prosecutor, Mr. William D. Mitchell, transmitted his comprehensive "Report on the Chicago Tribune Case" to Attorney General Francis Biddle and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. His conclusion, after he had reviewed the law, the evidence, and the circumstances surrounding the "leak," ended by suggesting that "the game may not be worth the candle" and that the national effort would be better served if the case were dropped.182
In the mind of the special prosecutor, none of his major reasons for dropping the case concerned the safeguarding of communications intelligence. Three salient points concerning the merits of the government's case were cited instead. All were related to the personal behavior of the principals]http://www.subcommittee.com/forum/icon_cool.gif[/img]
To All those Who Had Relatives And Friends There...... A Long Whistle And A Salute!
This Excerpt Comes Off The Net from Chris Hawkinson. Very Interesting Reading......
THE BATTLES BEGIN
As predicted by Hypo, the Japanese offensive against the Aleutians began on 3 June: Japanese carrier aircraft attacked Dutch Harbor at 1555Z/0655 locally.137 A little over two hours after Admiral Nimitz repeated his second alert, while the Japanese renewed their attack on Dutch Harbor, Midway notified him that the Japanese "Main Body" was sighted at 2100Z by a patrol plane on a bearing of 261 degrees and a distance of 700 miles from Midway.138 Eighteen minutes later, apparently as a result of Hawaii's receipt of the report of another patrol plane, CINCPAC learned that a second group of ships had been sighted. The second, a smaller group of warships and cargo vessels, was located 470 miles from Midway. Nimitz immediately forwarded this information to the task force commanders, to Admiral King, and to General Emmons, COMGENHAWDEPT.139 Two hastily prepared clarifications were sent later that stated his belief that the forces sighted were the "attack and occupation force," the most distant consisting of "11 ships course 090 speed 19." The Strike Force was "expected to be separated."140 All of this information and the roles of CINC 5, CINC 1st Air Fleet, and CINC 2 were included in CINCPAC's Bulletin Number 81 sent in the late afternoon of 3 June.141
Com 14's daily report was released in mid-afternoon on 3 June several hours before the Alaska operations began. It was a timely summary of the knowledge gained from translations and other analysis. Most of it quickly found its way to the task forces. Hypo isolated those units "interested in operations against U.S. possessions." Their report correctly if too briefly identified Admiral Yamamoto, CINC Combined, as "in general charge." The actual role of the First Fleet as "Main Body" of the two operations continued to elude analysis. Hypo reported that Admiral Yamamoto, the commander of this fleet, "appeared only marginally interested in the current operations. All the other major commanders were correctly identified: Admiral Kondo, CINC 2, whose battleships, cruisers, and destroyers supported both the Strike and Occupation Forces, was characterized as "in command of invasion forces in Midway area"; CINC First Air Fleet as "in command of Striking Forces against Central Pacific bases"; and CINC Fifth Fleet as "in command of invasion and Striking Forces in North."142
Com 14's analysis was hampered by the fact that no traffic was originated by any of the Japanese commanders after either 28 or 29 May 1942. Since the entire Combined Fleet observed radio silence and a new cipher was introduced in JN 25 at the same time, analysts were left with virtually nothing to analyze except communications contacts initiated by shore-based radio stations, and old messages to and from ships at sea in the Baker 8 cipher. In the latter category was an errant transmission from the cruiser Nagara revealing her role, as flagship of the Strike Force's plane guard destroyers, a fact that was immediately conveyed to the CTFs.143 Shore-station communications, however, remained active. Though messages originated by shore stations could not be read, their contacts revealed that Wake was not a stopping-off place for either the Strike Force or the Invasion Force.
Among the many topics demanding Admiral Nimitz's attention at this time was the need to ensure an adequate flow of information into his headquarters during the forthcoming battles. Recalling the paucity of information available during the Battle of the Coral Sea and mindful that certain matters concerning enemy losses in that battle were still not resolved, Admiral Nimitz sent a quick reminder to Midway and to CTFs 4, 7, 9, 16, and 17: "Successful and timely employment Striking Forces. . . almost wholly dependent on reliable combat intelligence with emphasis on enemy composition, position and condition. Damage to enemy must be carefully evaluated and reasonably certain results be reported. Reports must get through promptly."144 Unfortunately, the record of 4 June suggests that his guidance could not be followed by those he most depended upon, the carriers and the B17s. Obviously full of confidence in his intelligence and his plans for the next day's action, however, Admiral Nimitz also sent this encouraging message to Midway and all task force commanders at the eleventh hour on 3 June: "The situation is developing as expected. Carriers our most important objective should soon be located. Tomorrow may be the day you can give them the works."145
(The next day, 5 June 1942, in apparent response to the Nimitz message cited above, Washington directed the use of new terminology to describe communications intelligence and new cryptographic systems for its transmittal. The abbreviations "DI" for decryption intelligence, "TI" for traffic intelligence, and "RI" for radio intelligence were now mandated. Any message or report containing DI was to be transmitted in the COPEK system. Information from TI alone was to be sent in the CETYH system. Both systems were apparently available to all COMB addressees since there was no immediate change in distribution. 146 It is impossible to determine if this guidance was a help or a hindrance. It is certain, however, that, during the battle, it was ignored by everyone.)
Just after midnight on the morning of 4 June, Nimitz realized that he had not yet advised the task forces how far the "Main Body" was from Midway. Accordingly, he repeated messages sent earlier concerning its course and speed and included the information that this force was now "574 miles" from Midway.147 All remained quiet until shortly after dawn when at 1804Z/0604 local time on Midway on 4 June, a reconnaissance plane from Midway spotted two Japanese carriers and their escorts and transmitted an electrifying report that was immediately repeated by Admiral Nimitz to his task forces, to Admiral King, and to General Emmons: "Many planes heading Midway from 320 distant 150 miles!"148 Less than half an hour later, at 1835Z, Midway was struck by Japanese carrier aircraft.149 History does not provide an explanation of why the Japanese chose to launch aircraft 150 rather than 50 miles from their objective. It is possible that the original translation was somehow flawed. The flaw could have been in any of several places, for example, the preparation, transmittal, or intercept of the text of the message, or in an incorrect code group meaning. All of this mattered very little on 4 June, however, when the Japanese carrier aircraft were spotted on their way to strike Midway.
Of the more than 200 units of the Japanese Combined Fleet deployed in the Alaska and Midway operations, no fewer than 129 were either warships (113) or submarines (16). At Midway, however, primarily because of the requirements of their complex plan and their losses in the Coral Sea, the Japanese could actually produce but 4 carriers, 17 escorts, 229 aircraft, and 17 seaplanes. The remaining Japanese vessels and aircraft were either committed to the Northern operation or were too far away to support the carriers.150
Compared to the onrushing Japanese Strike and Occupation Forces, the United States Navy was able to muster only seventy-three ships (forty-seven warships and twenty-six submarines). However, the United States was able to concentrate its forces and produce at Midway a slight advantage where it counted the most, at the scene of the battle. The United States had 3 carriers and 22 escorts at sea, 234 aircraft afloat, and 110 at Midway. All of these vessels and aircraft, as well as a few of the submarines, were on the scene at Midway on the morning of 4 June 1942.
In addition, Admiral Nimitz and his task force commanders had other less tangible but invaluable advantages as well: advance knowledge of the identity of Japanese objectives; virtually the entire Japanese Midway and Aleutian Strike Forces order of battle; the organization of the Midway forces, i.e., Striking Force, Occupation Force, Invasion Force, etc.; the preliminary and final timetables of the Midway and Aleutian Striking Forces; the general direction from which each force would approach Midway; and the Midway Striking Force's plan of attack. All of this information was supplied by communications intelligence in time to influence decisively the provisions of Admiral Nimitz's Operations Plan 29-42.
As foretold by Rochefort and Layton, the Battle of Midway occurred three days before Admiral Yamamoto planned to assault the island with his landing forces. The Marines and sailors in their prepared positions on Midway, the Navy and Marine Corps flyers on Midway, the submarines in Task Force 4, the patrol aircraft in Task Force 7, the surface patrols in Task Force 9, the B17s in the 7th Bombing Command, and the carriers of Task Forces 16 and 17 all were ready for the fight. They were ready because Admiral Nimitz was able to position them in the relative certainty that the attacking Japanese warships and carriers would be where COMINT had predicted, at the day and time COMINT had provided.
In the absence of Japanese radio communications from the ships approaching Midway on 4 June, Hypo reported to Admiral Nimitz how they had disposed of their intercept resources to deal with the crisis. Watches were doubled under a "Condition 1" at the intercept station on Oahu, 151 and a combination radio direction finding and intercept facility was temporarily established on Midway. Intercepted traffic increased accordingly but not from the onrushing Japanese task forces.
Hypo concluded, "Excellent radio silence is being maintained despite the reported attacks on them." Thanks to the additional direction finding dispositions on Midway, as well as the reports received from naval aircraft of all types and from the army bombers operating from Hawaii and Midway, Admiral Nimitz was nevertheless in an excellent position not only to keep track of events but actually to control the movements of his own forces in relation to the attacking Japanese. This situation was in sharp contrast to the Battle of Coral Sea only a few weeks before, when CINCPAC was virtually blind to unfolding events.
When radio silence was finally broken by the attacking Japanese at about 1200 Midway local time, their frequencies were immediately intercepted and bearings reported probably by the temporary station at Midway.152 Except for encoded submarine communications, radio traffic consisted largely of plain language air-to-ground exchanges between carrier aircraft and the carriers that ended when the carriers themselves were lost. This information became part of an immense body of data concerning American efforts to learn the locations of the several Japanese task forces involved in the battle.
Admiral Nimitz's appreciation for the magnitude of his victory came gradually from visual observations and not from COMINT. Visual observations, however, were rife with ambiguous directional and ship identification information. More than once CINCPAC pleaded for more precision, particularly in those reports concerning the Japanese carriers.153 In the absence of Japanese carrier communications, it was finally from visual reports that he learned in mid-afternoon of the 4th that Admiral Nagumo had probably lost the four carriers of his Strike Force.154 Precise word of Nagumo's loss did come from COMINT, however, but not until 6 June when Hypo reported that Admiral Nagumo "appeared aboard the heavy cruiser Nagara sometime this morning, apparently having lost his flagship,"155 and Melbourne reported that the Chief of Staff, 1st Air Fleet, was also addressed aboard Nagara.156
As dawn approached on the morning of 5 June, Midway itself was safe. At midnight the night before, Admiral Nimitz had sent his heartfelt congratulations in a message to the task force commanders:
You who participated in the Battle of Midway today have written a glorious page in our history. I am proud to be associated with you. I estimate that another day of all out effort on your part will complete the defeat of the enemy.
That morning there was a growing but not universal consensus that the Japanese were hurriedly leaving the area. At one point during the morning of the 5th, CINCPAC originated a message to both TF 16 and 17, to Midway by cable, and to COMINCH, that the Japanese "will attempt assault and occupation Midway regardless past losses."157 In either case, the task of finding the enemy and inflicting still further punishment was preeminent. No one in CINCPAC headquarters was aware that Admiral Yamamoto had postponed part of the Northern Force's operations and temporarily diverted both the Second Strike Force and the Covering Group to assist Admiral Nagumo in his extremity. They were aware, however, of a report from Melbourne on the 5th that stated that CarDiv 3 "shows slight indication that unit may proceed southward to join forces in Midway area." Fortunately for the American cause, Admiral Yamamoto vacillated for several hours before deciding to cancel his orders and restore the forces diverted from the northern area. 158
In sharp contrast to the voluminous reports from Hypo and his intelligence staff, a more truncated view of events was recorded by the CINCPAC War Plans division. Their daily report to CINCPAC sheds an interesting light on the treatment of information obtained from intelligence sources. While adding nothing positive to the general body of knowledge, their efforts are of interest because they were recorded in the CINCPAC War Diary; they again demonstrate how, as in Washington, a war plans staff group in a major headquarters experienced difficulty in communicating with its leadership. In the CINCPAC War Diary for 5 June, War Plans summarized the Japanese Order of Battle of the Strike and Occupation Forces only and the results of the battle of 4 June on both sides. Their report did not record losses of a fourth Japanese carrier or the Yorktown, though by 050335Z (041635 Hawaiian War Time) CINCPAC knew of both the Japanese losses and the condition of the Yorktown. The summary ended by documenting the third air attack on Dutch Harbor and the sighting reports of two CVs southwest of that port, information probably received from Admiral Theobald's representative.159
On 6 June, Hypo was aware of and quickly reported the implications of the fact that the flag of the 1st Air Fleet, which was a recognizable communications entity, had moved from the Akagi to the cruiser Nagara. Analysts at Hypo also reported on the 6th that "at 1710 on 5 June CINC Combined began sending tactical traffic thus breaking his silence that began 28 May." Other significant items in COMINT reports for 6 June included the fact that 4AAF was prepared to provide air cover to all retiring elements; a call for CarDiv 5 probably to send the Zuikaku to the area; reflections of a U.S. air attack on Japanese cruisers, possibly the Mogami and the Mikumo; the fact that no carriers had been heard in the Midway area for twenty-four hours; and the startling revelation from radio direction finding that Admiral Yamamoto himself was in the North Pacific possibly in company with two divisions of battleships. This report represented Hypo's discovery of the Japanese Main Body.160
In a War Diary entry for the 6th, War Plans summarized the actions of the 4th and 5th. The Japanese were described as "retiring" as the U.S. search continued. The assessment of Japanese losses did not reflect the by then well-known fact that all four carriers were lost: two CV lost; two CV damaged; two BB damaged; two CA damaged; two AP damaged; and all aircraft either lost or badly damaged. Concerning the Yorktown, which on the 6th was struck by two torpedoes fired by the Japanese submarine I168,161 the War Plans entry noted only that attempts at salvage (from bomb damaged inflicted on the 4th) continued. Finally, the entry also noted that Dutch Harbor experienced its fourth air attack. 162
Admiral Spruance decided that the Battle of Midway ended on 8 June 1942.163 COMINT for 7 and 8 June chronicled the fact that the Japanese were withdrawing in two echelons. One group moved southwest toward Saipan under the protection of the 4AAF and the other, which included Admiral Yamamoto, was withdrawing to the northwest with air support from CarDiv 3.164 All activity was conducted under the direction of Admiral Yamamoto, who was now personally directing the final phases of his Midway operation. Routing of a message for CINC 1st Air Fleet from Ominato via the carrier Ryujo suggested to Hypo that possibly the admiral aboard this carrier from CarDiv 3, Rear Admiral Kakuji Kakuta, was the new senior officer in the 1st Air Fleet. Subsequent communications activity was to negate this suggestion by indicating that Admiral Nagumo was in fact still aboard the Nagara.165 Still sensitive to the fact that a missing Japanese carrier was a potential problem, Layton again sounded the alarm that the carrier Zuikaku could not be located. His report suggested that it may have been joining the forces withdrawing from Midway. Layton also reported that COMINT indicated no CVs remained among forces that attacked Midway.166
The disparity between current events and War Plans reporting continued for another day. An entry in CINCPAC's War Diary by War Plans on the 7th suggested either that the entry was written before the COMINT report became available or that War Plans analysts were unwilling to accept information from that source. Instead of reporting that all four Japanese carriers had been sunk by American flyers, the entry recorded "incomplete reports" from army bombers and from TF 16 that a possible fourth Japanese CV had been sunk. In the Aleutians, it reported contact with the Japanese was being maintained by PBYs but "no effective attacks by bombers or torpedoes." There was no reflection of the status of the Yorktown, which sank at 0501Z on 7 June 1042.167
By 8 June COMINT from both Melbourne and Hawaii was able to report that the withdrawing Japanese occupation forces under Admiral Kondo appeared to be headed for Saipan. Radio direction finding placed CINC Combined almost due west from Midway, and the remnants of the Strike Force appeared to be heading toward Japan.168 Layton's report for the day once again warned that the Zuikaku appeared to be active and might be en route to join the withdrawing forces.
169 Hypo confided to its War Diary that the Japanese in Tokyo had "commenced radio deception and were attempting to give the impression that a large fleet is maneuvering." In its daily report for the 8th, Hypo noted that tactical calls for up to twelve tactical units were traced to Tokyo through the "sloppy communications practices" of the Tokyo operator and DF.170 The 8th was the final day that the CINCPAC War Diary contained any information from War Plans concerning either Midway or the Aleutians. It recorded that the enemy continued to withdraw from Midway and that bad weather in the Aleutians hindered operations. Though the war continued in the Aleutians for several months, the Battle of Midway thus had three endings: on the 6th when Admiral Spruance turned away from his pursuit of the retreating Japanese; on the 7th when Admiral Fletcher's flagship, the Yorktown, finally sank beneath the waves; and for CINCPAC, on the 8th, when his diary no longer reflected an interest in the defeated Japanese forces.
CONCLUSIONS
After the battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians, the invaluable contributions made by communications intelligence were recognized by senior naval officials in Washington and Honolulu. In their words, communications intelligence had given the United States a "priceless advantage" over the Japanese.171 In few battles before or since would the navy possess an enemy's order of battle, their plan of attack, and their timetable, all of which had been provided to the naval high command by the communications intelligence units in Hawaii and Australia under the direction of Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and Lieutenant Rudolph Fabian, respectively.
With their performance during this period, both centers reclaimed the synergism that had marked their efforts before Pearl Harbor. There is no doubt that, had he lived to receive the Distinguished Service Medal - that was eventually posthumously awarded by the secretary of the navy in 1986 for his efforts to support CINCPAC prior to Midway - Commander Rochefort would have said that the medal truly belonged to the entire communications intelligence effort in the Pacific.172 (Fabian too was recommended for a DSM by MacArthur. Like Rochefort's, it too was not approved.)
On the eve of each of the battles fought in May and June 1942, Japanese communications security attempted to prevent U.S. monitors from penetrating the navy's intentions. It was not until the end of May, however, that radio silence effectively eliminated access by Hypo, Melbourne, and Washington to even those few messages related to the impending operations that were exchanged outside the confines of a new cipher and a new callsign system. Fortunately, the Japanese efforts to protect their secrets came too late to prevent what the world now knows was a major U.S. intelligence achievement.
Armed with the support of excellent communications intelligence and of his superiors in Washington, CINCPAC was able to satisfy all three of Clausewitz's "principles of warfare": decision, concentration, and offensive action. Prior to the invasion of Port Moresby, his fast carrier task forces successfully turned aside the Japanese strike force, virtually eliminated the effectiveness of Carrier Division Five originally scheduled to participate in the Midway operation, and forced postponement of the Japanese strikes on Ocean and Nauru by the judicious placement of CTF 16 when it was certain that the carriers Hornet and Enterprise would be spotted by Japanese patrols.
The same support from communications intelligence also allowed CINCPAC to deploy submarines, ships, B17s, B26s, fighters and observation planes to defend Midway and the Aleutians. By knowing the approximate dates for the planned attacks on the Aleutians and Midway, CINCPAC successfully disengaged his carrier task forces from the South Pacific after Coral Sea without being observed; he successfully redeployed them precisely where they could surprise the unsuspecting Japanese Strike Forces.
Without doubt these were major contributions to a truly decisive American victory, a victory of the magnitude of Salamis in 480 B.C. and Jutland in 1915. As a result of the Battle of Midway, the U.S. Pacific Fleet permanently frustrated all Japanese ambitions to establish a defensive perimeter anchored east of the Marshalls. Most importantly, however, the victory exposed to U.S. Navy planners Japan's incapability to wage effective carrier warfare in the central Pacific. Amidst its unrivaled success, however, this story of the contribution of communications intelligence is not quite complete.
Of the mobile detachments on the Lexington, the Yorktown, and the Enterprise, which accompanied the U.S. task forces (the Hornet had no detachment at Midway), we know in detail from the postaction recollections of Captain Forrest Biard, USN (ret) - who served under Admiral Fletcher, CTF 17, on the Yorktown - the type of contribution probably made to the commanders' tactical decision-making process during Coral Sea. At Midway, however, we know only that they "provided valuable information after contact was made, through interception of Japanese plain language reports."173 Thus until survivors reveal the detailed contributions made by communications intelligence to the tactical decisions of Admirals Fletcher and Spruance, CTF 17 and 16, respectively, the COMINT chronicle will be missing that part of the story. (Admiral Fullenwider, who supported Admiral Fletcher, is dead. Admiral Spruance was supported by a COMINT detachment for which the linguist was Captain Gilven Slonim, USN (ret). On 16 May 1989, Slonim advised the author that he was preparing a book about his experiences in the "RI" detachments that he plans to have published "in time for the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Midway.")
EPILOGUE
The Battle of Midway continued long after the combatants retired. Because of the confusion that surrounded the nascent and relatively unfamiliar U.S. Navy policies governing secrecy and need to know in 1942, the Battle of Midway was refought in the newspapers and courthouses of three major U.S. cities - New York, Chicago, and Washington - for several weeks after the battle actually ended. At issue was how the Navy knew of Japanese plans, how that knowledge came into the possession of a newspaper reporter, and how the government should handle a serious security violation. In the end no one was ever formally punished for revealing to the public the role communications intelligence played in the Japanese defeat. Whether the Japanese ever discovered that U.S. cryptologists had successfully penetrated their most secret operational code, or even suspected the magnitude of the warning provided by COMINT, remains a matter of conjecture to this day. At the time, however, officials within OP-20-G were certain that subsequent almost draconian corrections in Japanese communications procedures and cryptography were traceable directly to the following events.
On 17 May 1942, the survivors of the Lexington were en route to San Diego and San Francisco aboard the USS Barnett and the USS Elliot. (One account said that Admiral Fitch and Captain Sherman were aboard the transport Chester.) Anticipating their arrival in the United States, CINCPAC sent the following message to Admiral Fletcher, CTF 17, with information copies to COMINCH and the Commandants of the 11th and 12th Naval Districts:
It is imperative that all survivors Coral Sea action being returned Mainland be instructed that they are to refrain from any mention of the action upon their arrival west coast port. Com11 is requested berth transports where debarkation can be conducted without contact with newsmen. All personnel will probably require reoutfitting. There will be no publicity regarding this matter until Navy Department release. Barnett and Elliot will stop at San Diego to discharge excess personnel en route San Francisco. 174
Despite these precautions by CINCPAC, events aboard the Barnett resulted in even more damaging revelations than those CINCPAC had hoped to prevent. In ancillary actions, CINCPAC learned that medical reports filed in Navy Bureau of Medicine channels revealed the status of American carriers after the battle.
In a hasty message on 3 June 1942, CINCPAC notified COMINCH and requested immediate action to suppress the errant reports.175 at 2050 on 8 June 1942, COMINCH sent the following message to CINCPAC:
Contents of your 311221 May were published almost verbatim in several newspapers yesterday. Article originated with correspondent Stanley Johnson [sic] embarked on [USS] Barnett until June 2d. While your dispatch was addressed Task Force Commanders it was sent in channel available to nearly all ships which emphasizes need of care in using channels para. Cominch investigating on Barnett and at San Diego. 176
CINCPAC's message of 311221 May contained his final appreciation of the Japanese order of battle prior to Midway.
True to his word, COMINCH immediately convened several formal inquiry panels, which began gathering depositions from witnesses. The panels inquired into the circumstances aboard the Barnett, which, in addition to most of the crew, carried the executive officer of the Lexington, Commander Morton T. Seligman, and a newspaper correspondent, Mr. Stanley Johnston, back to the United States, and in Chicago in the headquarters Colonel R.R. McCormick's newspaper, the Chicago Tribune, where the story had originated.177 According to Admiral King's biographer, Thomas B. Buell in Master of Seapower, Admiral King "was in a white fury at his headquarters while his staff frantically tried to discover the source of the leak."
By 11 June all of the principals had been interviewed. Those aboard the Barnett were interviewed more than once. Out of this work emerged a very unpleasant picture of official neglect and confusion concerning the safeguarding of communications intelligence both on the Barnett and in the newspapers. Because of the perception that newsmen accompanying U.S. forces were sworn to secrecy, indictments of the principal employees of the Chicago Tribune were sought on 9 June, even before the inquiries were completed. They were returned on 7 July by a Chicago grand jury. At this point serious snags appeared at every turn, and the matter lay in the hands of the grand jury and a special prosecutor for several weeks while the navy added depositions to a record that increasingly showed that Johnston, a British subject, had, with the help or negligence of others, betrayed the trust placed in him.
While many in the navy focused on finding a suitable punishment for Johnston, COMINCH issued another memorandum on 20 June 1942 similar to those he had originated in March and April. It was sent to CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and CDR- SWPACFORCE bearing the subject "Control of Dissemination and Use of Radio Intelligence." Within the navy this would prove to be the only remedial action to come out of the Johnston case.178
On 24 June the New York newspaper PM published a story without attribution announcing that the Justice Department did not plan to prosecute anyone, either in the newspapers or in the U.S. Navy, 179 as a result of their role in the revelations. Ironically, three days later the navy discovered that Johnston's own government had earlier declared him "unreliable" as a correspondent.180 It was the same government, however, that subsequently forged the ultimate solution by addressing the correlation between the Johnston revelations and safeguarding communications intelligence.181
On 14 July, the special prosecutor, Mr. William D. Mitchell, transmitted his comprehensive "Report on the Chicago Tribune Case" to Attorney General Francis Biddle and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. His conclusion, after he had reviewed the law, the evidence, and the circumstances surrounding the "leak," ended by suggesting that "the game may not be worth the candle" and that the national effort would be better served if the case were dropped.182
In the mind of the special prosecutor, none of his major reasons for dropping the case concerned the safeguarding of communications intelligence. Three salient points concerning the merits of the government's case were cited instead. All were related to the personal behavior of the principals]http://www.subcommittee.com/forum/icon_cool.gif[/img]