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The Cuban Missile Crisis: 40 Years Later
With Thomas S. Blanton
Executive Director, National Security Archive
Wednesday, Oct. 16, 2002; 11 a.m. ET
Forty years ago today, President Kennedy called together his closest advisers to decide the course of action for the United States after the CIA had shown him evidence of Soviet missiles on the island of Cuba. The 13 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis gave meaning to the word "brinksmanship" and brought the world closer to disaster than it had ever been before.
Now, 40 years later, what have we learned about the politics of weapons of mass destruction? What went into the decisions that were made during those tense days? Are there lessons that apply today?
Thomas S. Blanton, executive director of the National Security Archive at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C., just returned from Havana, Cuba, where he organized a three-day conference: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A Political Perspective After 40 Years. Blanton was online to talk about the conference, those 13 days in 1962 and the politics of this historical event on Wednesday, Oct. 16.
Founded in 1985, the Archive has become the most prolific and successful non-profit user of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. Blanton serves as series editor of the Archive's microfiche, CD-ROM and Web publications of declassified documents, now totaling over 500,000 pages. His books include "White House E-Mail: The Top Secret Computer Messages the Reagan-Bush White House tried to Destroy" (The New Press, 1995). He has co-authored several other books, including "The Chronology" (Warner Books, 1987) on the Iran-Contra affair, "Litigation Under the Federal Open Government Laws" (American Civil Liberties Union, 1993), and "Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940" (Brookings Institution, 1998). His articles have appeared in The International Herald-Tribune, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Boston Globe, The Wilson Quarterly, the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, and other publications; and he has appeared on numerous national broadcasts including ABC News, Nightline, CNN Crossfire, PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer, and NPR All Things Considered. A Harvard graduate, the university's 1979 Newcomen Prize in history.
The transcript follows.
washingtonpost.com: Good morning, Tom, and thanks for joining us. You just recently wrapped up a conference in Havana with some of the key players of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even with all you know about those 13 days, what surprised you to uncover?
Thomas S. Blanton: The most surprising new evidence revealed that we were even closer to nuclear war than the policymakers knew at the time, and that's saying something, because on Saturday, October 27, Robert McNamara thought he might not live to see the sunrise. At the time, there was a crescendo of bad news: a U-2 shot down over Cuba, another U-2 straying over Siberia with US Air Force jets (also armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles) scrambling to head off possible MIG interception. The Joint Chiefs had recommended air strike and invasion of Cuba, as of 4 p.m. The Cubans were firing on all the low-level US recon flights. At the conference, we found out that exactly at that moment, US destroyers were dropping signaling depth charges on a Soviet submarine near the quarantine line that was carrying a nuclear-tipped torpedo -- totally unbeknownst to the US Navy. The Soviet captain lost his temper, there could be a world war up there, let's take some of them down with us, etc. Cooler heads prevailed, specifically the sub brigade deputy commander named Vasily Arkhipov, who was onboard and calmed the captain down. The sub came to the surface about 15 minutes after Soviet ambassador Dobrynin left Bobby Kennedy's office carrying RFK's urgent message to Khrushchev, time is running out, invasion in 48 hours, if you take the missiles out, we will pledge not to invade Cuba, plus we'll take our missiles out of Turkey as long as you don't mention that part of it publicly. Early the next morning, Khrushchev announced the Soviet missiles would be coming out.
The Cuban Missile Crisis: 40 Years Later
With Thomas S. Blanton
Executive Director, National Security Archive
Wednesday, Oct. 16, 2002; 11 a.m. ET
Forty years ago today, President Kennedy called together his closest advisers to decide the course of action for the United States after the CIA had shown him evidence of Soviet missiles on the island of Cuba. The 13 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis gave meaning to the word "brinksmanship" and brought the world closer to disaster than it had ever been before.
Now, 40 years later, what have we learned about the politics of weapons of mass destruction? What went into the decisions that were made during those tense days? Are there lessons that apply today?
Thomas S. Blanton, executive director of the National Security Archive at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C., just returned from Havana, Cuba, where he organized a three-day conference: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A Political Perspective After 40 Years. Blanton was online to talk about the conference, those 13 days in 1962 and the politics of this historical event on Wednesday, Oct. 16.
Founded in 1985, the Archive has become the most prolific and successful non-profit user of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. Blanton serves as series editor of the Archive's microfiche, CD-ROM and Web publications of declassified documents, now totaling over 500,000 pages. His books include "White House E-Mail: The Top Secret Computer Messages the Reagan-Bush White House tried to Destroy" (The New Press, 1995). He has co-authored several other books, including "The Chronology" (Warner Books, 1987) on the Iran-Contra affair, "Litigation Under the Federal Open Government Laws" (American Civil Liberties Union, 1993), and "Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940" (Brookings Institution, 1998). His articles have appeared in The International Herald-Tribune, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Boston Globe, The Wilson Quarterly, the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, and other publications; and he has appeared on numerous national broadcasts including ABC News, Nightline, CNN Crossfire, PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer, and NPR All Things Considered. A Harvard graduate, the university's 1979 Newcomen Prize in history.
The transcript follows.
washingtonpost.com: Good morning, Tom, and thanks for joining us. You just recently wrapped up a conference in Havana with some of the key players of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even with all you know about those 13 days, what surprised you to uncover?
Thomas S. Blanton: The most surprising new evidence revealed that we were even closer to nuclear war than the policymakers knew at the time, and that's saying something, because on Saturday, October 27, Robert McNamara thought he might not live to see the sunrise. At the time, there was a crescendo of bad news: a U-2 shot down over Cuba, another U-2 straying over Siberia with US Air Force jets (also armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles) scrambling to head off possible MIG interception. The Joint Chiefs had recommended air strike and invasion of Cuba, as of 4 p.m. The Cubans were firing on all the low-level US recon flights. At the conference, we found out that exactly at that moment, US destroyers were dropping signaling depth charges on a Soviet submarine near the quarantine line that was carrying a nuclear-tipped torpedo -- totally unbeknownst to the US Navy. The Soviet captain lost his temper, there could be a world war up there, let's take some of them down with us, etc. Cooler heads prevailed, specifically the sub brigade deputy commander named Vasily Arkhipov, who was onboard and calmed the captain down. The sub came to the surface about 15 minutes after Soviet ambassador Dobrynin left Bobby Kennedy's office carrying RFK's urgent message to Khrushchev, time is running out, invasion in 48 hours, if you take the missiles out, we will pledge not to invade Cuba, plus we'll take our missiles out of Turkey as long as you don't mention that part of it publicly. Early the next morning, Khrushchev announced the Soviet missiles would be coming out.